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Abstract—In this work, we propose a novel key reconciliation
protocol for the quantum key distribution (QKD). Based on
Newton’s polynomial interpolation, the proposed protocol aims
to correct all erroneous bits at the receiver without revealing
information to the eavesdropper. We provide the exact frame
error rate (FER) expression of the proposed protocol. The
inherent nature of the proposed algorithm ensures correcting
all erroneous bits if the algorithm succeeds. We present an
information-theoretical proof that the revealed information dur-
ing the key reconciliation process is equal to zero. We also provide
a numerical comparison of our algorithm with the asymptotic
performance of the error-correcting codes and two exemplary
low-density-parity-check (LDPC) codes. The results highlight that
our algorithm provides superior performance when compared to
the LDPC codes, regardless of the distance between Alice and
Bob. Furthermore, the proposed key reconciliation protocol is
usable for the longer quantum link distances than the state-of-
the-art protocols.
Index Terms—Key reconciliation, quantum key distribution,
polynomial interpolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
BY exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum physics,quantum key distribution (QKD) promises a theoretically
unbreakable shield for a shared message between two distant
nodes, Alice and Bob. As described in the first QKD protocol
[1], BB84, the uncertainty principle and the no-cloning prin-
ciple respectively avoid any eavesdropper to correctly decode
the shared message and to hide from Alice and Bob [2].
Considering these assurances, the shared message between
Alice and Bob is assumed to be information-theoretically
secure [3], and QKD provides the means to share the secret
keys that can be utilized for cryptographic purposes. Following
BB84, QKD has expanded into an active area of research,
both in theoretical and practical aspects. New key agreement
protocols have been proposed [4], [5], [6], and their security
proofs have been obtained [3].
As shown in Figure 1, in a QKD setup, two different
links are assumed to be available between Alice and Bob: a
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quantum link for the quantum key agreement process, and an
authenticated public communication link (shown as the public
channel) for the key reconciliation process. Both of these links
may be intercepted by an unauthorized eavesdropper node,
Eve. Alice generates the secret key message (key generation)
and transmits the secret message to Bob via the quantum
link. The transmitted message bits are converted into qubits
(bit/qubit), where generally are realized by the polarized light
beams and transmitted over a fiber network or a free space
optical (FSO) network [7]. Any eavesdropping activity on the
quantum link disrupts changes the state of the transmitted
qubit, and result in errors in the transmitted message. Besides
eavesdropping activity, the transmitted message signal also
fades as the link distance increases, named as path loss.
Therefore, Alice and Bob first determine the error rate of
their shared key (key sifting). Then, they utilize the public
authenticated communication link to correct the erroneous
message bits at the receiver, Bob (key reconcilation). The error
correction operation is named as key reconciliation, and any
shared information over the public channel is assumed to be
perfectly obtained by Eve. Since the shared information is
related to the secret key, Eve can obtain some amount of
information regarding the shared message. Therefore, Alice
and Bob both remove the related information that Eve may
capture in this process and consequently resulting in a reduced
key length. This problem is referred as information leakage
and reduces the efficiency of the key reconciliation algorithm.
The success rate of a key reconciliation protocol is defined
by frame error rate (FER), where it’s value is equal to the
probability of successful reconciliation.
The first key reconciliation algorithm, Cascade, targets cor-
recting the erroneous bits with minimum information leakage
[8]. As the length of the quantum link increases, the key
reconciliation becomes more challenging due to the increased
error rate. Furthermore, as the error rate increases, the amount
of communication between Alice and Bob also increases,
which referred to as communication overload [9]. To meet
these requirements, over the decades, some improvements are
introduced to the Cascade algorithm, but its main disadvan-
tage, the communication overload, is still an open issue [10],
[11].
Following Cascade, Winnow protocol is proposed to over-
come the communication overload problem. However, by in-
troducing additional errors (error propagation) at the receiver,
Winnow protocol limits the length of the QKD link. More
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Fig. 1. The system model of QKD. The proposed protocol corresponds to
key reconciliation block of the system model.
prominent key reconciliation is obtained by the utilization of
the error-correcting codes (ECC). They are easy to integrate
into QKD systems for the key reconciliation purposes since
they are already intensively researched for reversing the dis-
ruptive channel fading effects in the mobile communication
networks. While the computational complexity varies accord-
ing to the selected code, error propagation and information
leakage are still open issues in these code-based approaches
[12], [13]. By providing favorable error rate performance and
comparatively low complexity structures, low-density-parity-
check (LDPC) codes are the most intensely utilized ECC
types, and the-state-of-the-art results are given in [14]. More
recently, in our previous work, we have proposed a key
verification protocol that finds and removes all of the erroneous
bits by blocking any information reveal to Eve in this process
[15]. One drawback of this protocol is that Alice and Bob
both lose some of the correct bits as well as the erroneous bits
since we remove them from the shared message completely.
The literature still lacks a key reconciliation protocol that can
correct all erroneous bits without revealing any information
even considering long quantum links, where the initial error
rates are very high.
In this paper, we propose a key reconciliation protocol
that aims to correct all erroneous bits with zero information
leakage. The fundamental idea behind our key reconciliation
protocol is based on polynomial interpolation as Shamir’s (k,n)
thresholding scheme. Before starting the key reconciliation,
the original and received messages at respectively Alice and
Bob are divided into blocks with equal lengths, and the key
reconciliation protocol is applied to each block separately.
First, Alice selects a certain number of bits in a block and
generates random numbers in a finite field with the same
number of selected bits. Then, the protocol interpolates a
polynomial, where the vertical axis values of the polynomial
are the selected bits, and the horizontal axis values of the
polynomial are the randomly generated numbers. The vertical
axis values for the remaining bits in the block are obtained
according to the interpolated polynomial. Then, all horizontal
axis values are shared via the public communication channel.
The aim of Bob is obtaining the same polynomial with the
received message bits and shared horizontal axis values. Bob
can obtain the same polynomial if and only if he has a certain
number of correct bits. By interpolating the polynomial and
obtaining its roots, Bob can find which part of the message is
erroneous and correct them. Also, the shared information can
not be used by Eve unless she knows a predetermined number
of bit-streams through the key bits, which is limited by the
nature of the QKD system [2].
The main contributions of this paper can be listed as below;
• We propose a polynomial interpolation based key rec-
onciliation protocol for QKD. We obtain the exact FER
expression for our algorithm.
• The proposed reconciliation protocols also ensures identi-
cal secret keys at Alice and Bob, if the protocol succeeds.
Therefore, the error propagation through the key reconcil-
iation process is prevented by the inherent characteristics
of the proposed approach.
• We provide an information theoretical proof that the
proposed protocol leaks no information to Eve, by solely
sharing unrelated information during the key reconcilia-
tion process.
• We provide numerical analysis to compare the perfor-
mance of our protocol with the asymptotical performance
of the error correcting codes and two of the state-of-the-
art LDPC codes considering a fiber link and an FSO link
for the quantum key agreement part.
One drawback of our algorithm is the increased com-
putational complexity in comparison to state-of-the-art key
verification algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the
following section, we give the mathematical foundations on
polynomial interpolation, root finding and describe the phys-
ical parameters of the QKD system model. Then, in Section
III, the proposed key reconciliation algorithm is described. In
Section IV, we provide the performance analysis metrics of
our algorithm. The numerical analysis is given in Section V,
and finally, the concluding remarks are drawn and the future
work is presented in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The polynomial interpolation along with the root finding
are the main ingredients of the proposed protocol. Therefore,
the first part of this section is devoted to a brief summary of
these ingredients over finite fields, and then we provide the
basic concepts of the QKD system.
A. Polynomial Interpolation
Let (x0, y0), . . . , (xn, yn) be points on Euclidean space,
Newton theorem says there exists a unique polynomial of
degree at most n interpolating these points.
Theorem 1. [16] Let (x0, y0), . . . , (xk, yk) be points on the
graph of a function f(x). There exists a unique polynomial
p(x) of degree ≤ k such that p(xi) = f(xi) = yi for i =
0, . . . , k.
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Fig. 2. Depiction of the proposed key reconciliation process.
Finding such an interpolating polynomial p(x) is not a
tedious task if one applies Newton’s divided difference method
or Lagrange interpolation. Restricting the degree of a polyno-
mial provides the uniqueness and it is the main factor that
polynomial interpolation has been applied to certain problems
in secure digital communication [17]. The security depends on
the hardness of the following statement.
Proposition 1. Let p(x) be a polynomial of degree k over a
finite field with size ≥ 1020. The probability of a random point
on Euclidean plane being on the graph of p(x) is negligible.
Proof. See [17]
For example, if the polynomial is over the real field R,
it is even impossible to find a point on the graph of p(x)
without knowing the actual polynomial. On the other hand, the
polynomials that are going to be employed for our purposes
lie in a finite field. The selection of a large size finite field
is going to give confidence that a random point will not be
on the graph. That is the reason for utilizing polynomials in
secret sharing and quantum key exchange. In other words, let
p(x) be a polynomial of degree k over the real numbers R, it
is impossible to construct p(x) even if k points on the graph
of it is known.
B. Root Findings
Let Fp be a finite field with p number of elements where p is
a prime integer. Let f(x) be a polynomial of degree k defined
over Fp. The proposed algorithm will seek roots of f(x) over
the field Fp or any extension of it. The polynomial f(x) is
constructed randomly, therefore it is hard to predict where its
roots lie. On the other hand, several mathematical tools allow
one to locate an extension field of Fp where the roots of f(x)
belong. Note that, the gcd(a, b) denotes the greatest common
divider of a and b.
Theorem 2. Let f(x) be polynomial of degree k in Fp[x]. The
degree of gcd(xp−x, f(x)) gives the number of roots of f(x)
which lie on Fp.
Proof. This is an easy consequence of Fermat’s little theorem
which basically says a ∈ Fp if and only if ap ≡ a mod p.
Theorem 2 suggests a method to decide where the other
roots lie. For example, the degree of gcd(xp
2 − x, g(x))
gives the number roots in the degree 2 extension field of Fp.
Similarly, computing gcd(xp
e−x, f(x)) for e = 2, . . . , k gives
the places of all roots of f(x). This process is in general
called distinct degree factorization, see [Section 1.6] [18] for
more details. Once the location of roots is established, root-
finding algorithms can be applied. Consider the distinct degree
factorization gives an extension degree of Fp where the roots
are located. For example, if some roots are in Fpe1 and the rest
is in Fpe2 then root-finding algorithms should be performed
for the field Fplcm(e1,e2) where lcm(e1, e2) is the least common
multiple of e1 and e2.
Once the extension field is determined, the next aim to find
all roots. Let f(x) be the polynomial over Fp such that all
of its roots lie in an extension Fq where q = pe. There are
various algorithms to find a root of f(x) in Fq . For example, a
root-finding algorithm defined in [Section 1.6] [18] describes
a probabilistic method to determine at least one root of f(x).
Basically, it suggests randomly selecting a member α ∈ Fq
and computing gcd(x
q−1
2 − α, f(x)). This might result in a
root of f(x). On the other hand, the proposed algorithm needs
to compute more than one root, this method would not be
effective for our purposes. Therefore, at one point our method
is going to employ a polynomial factorization algorithm.
The practical polynomial factorization algorithms are all
probabilistic [19]–[21]. Let f(x) be a reducible polynomial
over Fp where p is a prime number. Berlekamp’s algorithm
and Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm first searches a polynomial
h(x) such that
h(x)p ≡ h(x) mod p
Then, the algorithms decides an element c ∈ Fp and computes
gcd(f(x), h(x) − c). The probability of success for both
algorithms is around 1/2. On the other hand, the algorithm
described in [21] works on any extension field and the prob-
ability of success is always more than 3/4. The algorithm
employs singular curves and their Jacobian groups.
4C. Quantum Key Distribution
In this part, we provide the basics of QKD. For the following
of this part, we adopted the notation and equations in [22].
As shown in Figure 1, a QKD system consists of two links:
(i) a quantum channel for the key agreement process and
(ii) an authenticated public communication channel for the
key distillation process. In the key agreement process, Alice
transforms the generated key bit string KA of length 2L
into qubits and shares them via the quantum channel. Bob
measures these qubits and maps measurement results into his
key bit string KB of length 2L. Due to the characteristics
of the quantum channel and possible eavesdropping activity,
Bob does not know the accuracy of his measurements and
needs to estimate the disparities between the KA and KB .
Key distillation is a post processing step that is used to obtain
identical secret keys at Alice and Bob. The process starts
with key sifting. In key sifting, Alice and Bob share half
of the randomly selected bits and estimate quantum bit error
rate (QBER) denoted by . After key distillation, if QBER is
lower than the error toleration rate Γ, Alice and Bob remove
the shared bits, and each of them starts key reconciliation
with L number of bits. The remaining bit string at Alice
is denoted by A, and the remaining bit sitring at Bob is
denoted by B. The proposed key reconciliation process is
defined by R(A,B) = [S, Y ], where the final secret key
string S is obtained from the correlated bit strings A and B
by exchanging information string Y .
QBER can be evaluated by
 =
pd
pexp
,
where pd is the dark count rate. pexp is the total photon
detection rate, and
pexp = psignal + pd − psignalpd.
psig denotes the signal detection rate, and can be approximated
by
psignal = µtη,
where µ, t and η denote respectively the quantum efficiency of
the detector, transmitivity and the average number of emitted
photons per pulse. In order to obtain secret key rate in the
following sections, an upper bound for the fraction of detected
single photons, Υ1, can be given by
Υˆ1 = 1− pmulti(µ)
pexp
≤ Υ1.
pmulti(µ) = 1−(1+µ)e−µ denotes the probability of emitting
two or more photons. The error rate of single photon pulses
is upper-bounded by ε = 
Υˆ1
.
H(A) denotes the Shannon entropy of the binary random
variable A ∈ {a1, a2}, where the probabilities P (A = a1) = θ
and P (A = a2) = 1− θ. H(θ) can be given by
H(θ) = −θ log2(θ)− (1− θ) log(1− θ).
By using the provided equalities, we can estimate the QBER
performance of any designed QKD system by simply adapting
the physical parameters of the test system.
III. THE PROPOSED KEY RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
As described in Section II.C., Alice and Bob start the key
reconciliation with L number of bits. As a first step Alice and
Bob divide their respectively keys A and B into m number of
blocks with length of s, where L = ms. The key reconciliation
operation is the same for all blocks so let us assume that both
Alice and Bob work on the first block. That is Alice’s side
block is
BA = 01b1b2 . . . bs
and Bob’s side block is
BB = 01b
′
1b
′
2 . . . b
′
s.
Suppose the error toleration rate is Γ and
r = bs− s · Γc
In literature, Γ can be at most 0.15 [9] and in our case we
assume Γ is less than 0.30. Alice randomly selects r + 2
number of distinct elements z1, z2, x1, x2, . . . , xr ∈ Fp and
sets up the pairs:
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (x1, b1), (x2, b2), . . . , (xr, br)
Then she constructs f(x) of degree less than r+ 2 interpo-
lating the above points. In the next step, she solves:
f(x) = br+1
f(x) = br+2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
f(x) = bs
for x. Suppose she obtains xr+1, xr+2, . . . , xs. Note that
x coordinates must be distinct. Alice then broadcasts
z1, z2, x1, x2, . . . , xs. The preselection of first two bits 0 and
1 prevents the polynomial f(x) being a constant polynomial
in case all bi are the same. Note that the probability of degree
f(x) being different than r + 1 is negligible by Proposition
1. Therefore, we might assume degree of f(x) is r + 1
from now on. If s − (r + 1) is larger than the r + 1 and
br+1 = br+2 = · · · = bs then the roots xr+3, . . . , xs would
not be exist. That is the reason, we assume the number Γ is
always less than 30.
Bob receives the sequence z1, z2, x1, x2, . . . , xs from Alice
in an open network. Bob’s side constructed BB via quantum
channel. He selects a random permutation function
σ : {1, 2, . . . , s} → {1, 2, . . . , s}
and then constructs set of pairs
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (xσ(1), b
′
σ(1)), . . . , (xσ(r), b
′
σ(r+1))
Bob then finds a polynomial f ′(x) interpolating all these
pairs. Once the degree of f ′(x) is r + 1, then Bob concludes
his polynomial is the same as Alice’s one. Note that Bob
interpolates r + 3 pairs and if they are not on the graph of
Alice’s polynomial, the probability that Bob’s polynomial is
of degree r+1 is negligible by Proposition 1. Constructing the
same function with Alice allows Bob to remove error terms
5Algorithm 1 : Key Established Algorithm: Alice’s Side
Input: A block of bit string BA with size s.
Output: (z1, z2, x1, x2, . . . , xs) ∈ Fs+2p and the degree r+1.
1: Select random elements z1, z2 ∈ Fp and a random permu-
tation function
δ : {1, 2, . . . , s} → {1, 2, . . . , s}
Then again randomly select xδ(1), xδ(2), . . . , xδ(r) ∈ Fp.
2: Construct pairs:
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (xδ(1), bδ(1)), (xδ(2), bδ(2)), . . . , (xδ(r), bδ(r))
3: Find a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fp[x] interpolating above set
of pairs.
4: Set
f(x) = bδ(r+1)
f(x) = bδ(r+2)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
f(x) = bδ(s)
and find xδ(r+1), . . . , xδ(s).
5: return The set (z1, z2, x1, . . . , xs) and the degree r+ 1.
in the bit string in his side. Suppose his jth bit doesn’t match
with the jth bit in Alice’s side, that is bj 6= b′j . He just observes
this discrepancy while computing f(xj).
The key is established at Alice’s side using Algorithm 1.
The integer s represents the number of elements in each
block. First, Alice selects two random elements z1, z2 ∈ Fp
and a random permutation map δ on {1, 2, . . . , s}. Then, she
also randomly selects xδ(1), xδ(2), . . . , xδ(r) ∈ Fp (Step 1).
Following that, she sets up r + 2 pairs
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (xδ(1), bδ(1)), (xδ(2), bδ(2)), . . . , (xδ(r), bδ(r))
(Step 2). In the next step, she constructs the interpolation
polynomial f(x) ∈ Fp[x] with degree r+1 (Step 3). By using
root findings methods, she determines the remaining pairs
(xδ(r+1), bδ(r+1)), (xδ(2), bδ(2)), . . . , (xδ(s), bδ(s))
(Step 4). At the end, the algorithm outputs the set
(z1, z2, x1, . . . , xs) and the degree r + 1.
The key established method of Bob’s side is given in
Algorithm 2. Initially, Bob selects a random permutation
map σ on {1, 2, . . . , s}. He also selects r elements in
xσ(1), . . . , xσ(s)(Step 1). Upon completion of previous step,
he sets up r + 3 pairs
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (xσ(1), b
′
σ(1)), . . . , (xσ(r+1), b
′
σ(r+1))
and finds the interpolation polynomial f ′(x) ∈ Fp[x] (Step 2).
Since Bob’s aim is to find the Alice’s polynomial, he checks
whether deg f ′(x) is r + 1. He keeps changing the selection
of r+ 1 pairs in (xσ(1), b′σ(1)), . . . , (xσ(s), b
′
σ(s)) until he gets
deg(f ′(x)) = r+ 1. In the remaining part of Algorithm 2, he
checks the equation f ′(xσ(i)) = b′σ(i) for i = r + 2, . . . , s. If
Algorithm 2 : Key Established Algorithm: Bob’s Side
Input: A block of bit string BB and (z1, z2, x1, . . . , xs) ∈
Fs+2p and the degree r + 1.
Output: Compare BB to BA and correct error bits.
1: Select random permutation function
σ : {1, 2, . . . , s} → {1, 2, . . . , s}
and r elements in (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(s))
2: Construct pairs
(z1, 0), (z2, 1), (xσ(1), b
′
σ(1)), . . . , (xσ(r+1), b
′
σ(r+1))
and obtain a polynomial f ′(x) ∈ Fp[x] interpolating these
pairs.
3: if deg f ′(x) == r + 1 then
4: for i = r + 2 to s do
5: if f ′(xσ(i)) == b′σ(i) then
6: keep b′σ(i)
7: else
8: replace b′σ(i) with f
′(xσ(i)).
9: end if
10: end for
11: else
12: return Step 1.
13: end if
14: return The bit string BA.
the equation satisfies, he concludes that the bit b′σ(i) matches
with Alice’s side. In the other case, he changes the bit b′σ(i)
with f ′(xσ(i)). At the end of the process, Bob finds wrong
bits in his side and corrects them.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Computation Complexity
1) Complexity of Algorithm 1: Algorithm 1 first randomly
selects element in finite field Fp. Then pairs up r of these
randomly selected elements with the generated bits. Then
interpolates r + 2 pairs and constructs a polynomial f(x) of
degree r + 1. The next steps requires to find roots of f(x)
over an extension field Fq of Fp. In terms of running time,
finding the roots of a polynomial of degree r+1 is much more
costly than interpolating r + 2 pairs. Therefore, with respect
to running time, the dominating step of the algorithm is the
root finding step. Finding roots of a polynomial f(x) over Fp
requires several sub-steps as mentioned in the Subsection II-B.
The first sub-step is to locate the extension field which contains
the roots of f(x). This requires performing several greatest
common divisor algorithm for polynomials. There exist many
algorithms to compute the greatest common divisor between
two polynomials. In the respect of the cost of computation,
calculating gcd of two polynomials of degree at most r in Fp
takes O((2r2+r) log p) operations with the algorithm given in
[Section 6.9] [23] and [24]. We prefer to apply a polynomial
factorization algorithm to find roots of f(x) over the extension
field Fq where the all roots lie and q = pe for some integer
e > 0. Since most of the time all roots will not be in Fp instead
they will be an extension field of it, the algorithm defined
6in [21] is more convenient to be employed. Therefore, the
polynomial factorization algorithm to find all roots will costs
at most O(r4 log p). This is because the algorithm’s running
time is approximately O(r3 log q) and q ≤ pr. Overall, the
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(r4 log p) operations.
2) Complexity of Algorithm 2: The algorithm running on
the receiver’s side is similar to the algorithm presented in [15]
which costs O(r2) operations.
B. Frame Error Rate
In error correction coding, FER is equal to zero if the code-
word is correct, and equal to one even if one-bit mismatches in
the codeword. Similarly, in QKD, FER is only equal to zero if
all erroneous bits are correct after key reconciliation. However
considering the variety of error patterns and random error
distribution, FER becomes the expected value of a random
variable, where the outcome of the variable is equal to 0 for
a successful reconciliation and 1 for a fail. As described in
Section III, Bob reconciles a block of the secret key by finding
the degree of the polynomial, consequently, the polynomial
itself, if he can correctly decode at least r+ 1 number of bits
in a block of s number of bits. In this case, considering a single
block, FER is equal to the probability of having at least r+ 1
number of correct bits in the block of Bob’s key. Considering k
consecutive blocks, FER for the key reconciliation protocol be-
comes the kth power of the aforementioned probability. Then,
assuming quantum channel as a binary symmetric channel with
error probability  = QBER [22], [7], the exact FER for our
algorithm can be given by
FER = 1−
(
s∑
z=r+1
(1− )z()l−z
)k
, (1)
where  can be evaluated as in Subsection II.C. One obser-
vation from this equation is that FER would increase at the
same QBER as we divide the same key into more blocks. This
property provides a trade-off between FER and complexity
performance. Besides, a trade-off between FER and the secu-
rity level can be observed from the selection of the r. As we
select larger r values, the protocol becomes more prominent to
eavesdropping attacks, while FER performance reduces since
Bob requires to find more correct bits at his block. FER is
one of the main indicators for the key reconciliation process.
In the following section, we will provide a comparison of our
algorithm and error-correcting codes in terms of FER.
C. Analysis of the Information Leakage
As depicted in Figure 1, during the QKD process, the infor-
mation regarding to key can be disclosed with two different
information exchange processes: key agreement part in the
quantum channel and key reconciliation part in the standard
communication channel [7]. The total amount of disclosed
information to Eve is referred as information leakage and
denoted by
Ilk , I(A;E),
where I(A;E) denotes the mutual information of the secret
at Alice and Eve. Then, we can state that
Ilk(S) = Iqlk(S) + Iplk(S).
Here Iqlk(S) is the amount of leaked information during the
quantum key agreement part where Alice and Bob use the
quantum communication link. Iplk(S) is the amount of leaked
information during the key reconciliation part where Alice and
Bob use the classical public link.
The revealed information rate at quantum key agreement
part can be given by [22]
Iqlk(S) = Υ1H(ε)L.
During the key reconciliation, the transmission medium is
assumed to be an authenticated public channel, where any
transmitted information during the key reconciliation process
is assumed to be obtained from Eve. In the existing key rec-
onciliation schemes, Alice and Bob aim correcting erroneous
bits at Bob by sharing side information about the secret key.
According to Slepian-Wolf limit [25], revealed information
for the key reconciliation processes with error control coding
codes is lower bounded by
H() ≤ ρleak. (2)
By intuition, Alice reveals the minimum amount of informa-
tion if she knows Bob’s information about the secret. This as-
sures information leakage during the key reconciliation process
as long as  > 0. More specifically, the revealed information
in an (n, k) error correcting code is Iplk(S) = n− k, and the
revealed information rate is described by
ρleak =
n− k
n
. (3)
On the other hand, we block the information leakage during
the key reconciliation process. By lower bounding the degree
of the polynomial with the revealed information to Eve in
quantum channel, Eve cannot interpolate the polynomial with
her limited vertical axis observations and horizontal axis
values shared in key reconciliation process.
Theorem 3. Revealed information for our proposed key rec-
onciliation process is zero for Γ ≤ r−1n .
Proof. During the proposed key reconciliation scheme, the
only shared information is the y axis values of the generated
polynomial, y. Let us denote the mutual information of y and
the secret with I(S;Y ). Then,
Ilk(S) , I(S;Y ) = H(S)−H(S|Y ).
For the selected Γ ≤ r−1n , Eve is assumed to obtained at
most (r− 1) consecutive bits from the Alice’s key during the
key agreement process. Let us rewrite the uncertainty about
the secret at Eve as H(S|Y,Ar−1), where Ar−1 denotes any
permutation of (r − 1) number of bits from A and note that
from the chain rule
H(S|Y,Ar−1) ≤ H(S|Y ).
As proved in Shamir’s (k,n) thresholding scheme [17], r − 1
revealed element pairs (bi, xi), does not reveal any information
7about polynomial of degree r, where every candidate secret S
corresponds to a unique polynomial of degree r − 1. From
the construction of the polynomials, all their probabilities are
equal. Thus, if
H(S|Y,Ar−1) = H(S|Y ) = H(S)
then, I(S;Y ) = 0.
Reducing information leakage to zero indicates that we can
utilize all secret key bits in the final key insead of removing
the leaked part. Therefore, secret key throughput performance
improves considering all distances and initial QBER values as
detailed in the following part.
D. Secret Key Throughput
Similar to the goodput analysis in communication networks,
secret key throughput indicates the number of available secret
key bits generated in a second. Secret key throughput is
defined as
S = rsfsc, (4)
where rs is the secret key rate. fsc denotes the generated secret
key bits in a second, more formally referred to as the frequency
of the key source. The secret key rate is given by
rs = (1− FER)pexpqρ, (5)
where ρ denotes the secret key fraction with one-way recon-
ciliation schemes and FER is defined in (1). Since we only
consider the successfully reconciled secret keys at the end of
the QKD process, the rate of the unsuccessful reconciliation
processes (in other words FER) is subtracted by the secret
key fraction with one-way reconciliation schemes that obtained
after the quantum key agreement part. The secret key fraction
in our case can be given by
ρ = Υ1(1−H(ε))− ρleak. (6)
(4)-(6) highlight the effect of FER and information leakage
in key reconciliation to the secrecy throughput of the QKD
system.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the parameters for numerical
analyses and the results in parts. First, we present the nu-
merical analyses regarding the quantum key exchange part of
the QKD and then we will provide the performance analyses
of different key reconciliation protocols considering different
quantum link realizations.
A. Quantum Key Agreement
In numerical analysis, we mainly consider two different
implementations of the quantum link: a fiber link and an FSO
link. The parameters for these links are given in Table I and
are detailed in Section II. Note that, the parameters are directly
obtained from the experimental works of QKD.
The transmitivity of the fiber link is given by
tfiber = 10
−αK
10 , (7)
TABLE I
THE LINK REALIZATION PARAMETERS FOR NUMERICAL ANALYSIS. THE
PARAMETERS FOR FIBER LINK AND FSO LINK ARE OBTAINED FROM
RESPECTIVELY [22] AND [26].
Realization Parameters Fiber FSO
fs [GHz] 1 1
K [km] 0− 60 0− 30
q 0.5 0.5
pd 10
−5 10−5
α [dB/km] 0.2 0.1
η 0.1 0.15
ds [cm] n.a. 25
dr [cm] n.a. 25
D n.a. 3.21
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Distance(km)
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
QB
ER
Fiber
FSO
Fig. 3. The relationship between QBER and link distance for fiber and FSO
links.
where K is the distance in km [22]. The transmitivity of the
FSO link is given by
tFSO =
(
dr
ds +Dl
)2
10
−αK
10 , (8)
where ds and dr are the apartures of the transmitting and
receiving telescopes. D is the divergence of the beam. Note
that, ds, dr and D are not applicable for the fiber link.
QBER values with corresponding distances for the fiber and
the FSO links are given in Figure 3. Even though the QBER
performance of FSO link is better than fiber in short distance
regime (0-3 km), QBER increases faster in FSO link in
comparison with fiber link. Therefore, the key reconciliation
becomes more challenging especially in the long distance FSO
links.
B. Key Reconciliation
We consider two different LDPC codes and an asymptotic
limit for the error correcting codes to compare the performance
of our algorithm. LDPC-1 and LDPC-2 codes in this paper
directly correspond to respectively (1008, 504) regular LDPC
Code-3 and (1998, 1776) regular LDPC Code-4 in [27]. We
80 10 20 30 40 50 60
Distance(km)
100
101
102
103
Se
cr
et
 K
ey
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t [b
ps
]
ECC Asymptotic
Our algorithm
LDPC-1
LDPC-2
Fig. 4. Secret key throughput comparison of different key reconciliation
algorithms considering fiber links.
also evaluate the FER values for the corresponding codes
from the Eq. (5) of [27] with the parameters as in Table 1
of [27]. The leaked information for LDPC codes are obtained
by Eq. (3). We also consider the asymptotic performance for
the ECC based key reconciliation schemes. By setting ρleak
as in Eq. (2) for the asymptotic ECC case, we assume that
the leaked information equals to the Slepian-Wolf limit. For
our algorithm, we consider s = 100, m = 10 and r = 30.
Figure 4 shows the change in secret key throughputs with link
distance considering 2 different LDPC codes, our algorithm
and asymptotic performance of ECC. As it can be observed
from the figure, the proposed algorithm outperforms other
coding schemes and their asymptotic limit. Since our algorithm
provides zero information leakage in the key reconciliation
process, it outperforms other methods in the short distance
region. In other words, the proposed algorithm provides the
same secret key throughput at longer link distances than the
ECC based key reconciliation schemes. For example, the pro-
posed algorithm provides 100 bps secret key throughput at 33
km, while LDPC-1 and LDPC-2 provide the same throughput
value at respectively 2 and 20 km distances. Furthermore,
our algorithm can also perform in the long-distance regime
contrary to ECC schemes, since it has very low FER rates
even in the high QBER regime.
Figure 5 illustrates the secret key throughputs considering
the FSO quantum link. Since QBER increases faster in the
FSO link, the FER increases more rapidly as the distance
increases. Therefore, the performance of ECC schemes drops
faster than the fiber link. Our algorithm can also perform at
longer distances in FSO link than ECC schemes. Since QBER
becomes 0.5 after 20 km in FSO, the detection in the binary
symmetric channel almost becomes arbitrary. Naturally, the
error floor occurs after 20 km distance in our algorithm.
Considering both of the figures, the proposed algorithm
provides a higher secret key throughput at all link distances.
Especially for the short distance interval, the improved per-
formance results from the zero information leakage property
of the proposed algorithm. As the distance between Alice and
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Fig. 5. Secret key throughput comparison of different key reconciliation
algorithms considering FSO links.
Bob increases, FER of our algorithm is not affected as much
as error-correcting codes. Therefore, our algorithm can pave
the way to the implementation of longer QKD links.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a polynomial interpolation
based key reconciliation protocol for quantum key distribution
(QKD). By solely sharing unrelated information with the secret
key, the revealed information to the eavesdropper is proven to
be zero during the key reconciliation process. We provided
the exact frame error rate (FER) expression for the proposed
protocol. As illustrated in the numerical studies, the proposed
protocol outperforms error-correcting codes by the means of
secret key throughput considering fiber and FSO links. We
consider reducing the computational complexity in the future
work by optimizing the block length and the number of blocks.
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